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C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000120

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POST FOR DCM AND RSO

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TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE- REO BASRAH 07/17/2006

REF: (A) STATE 115373; (B) BASRAH 0084

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (g)

¶1. (SBU) The Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) chaired a session of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on July 17 to discuss the security situation in Basrah and possible implications from the current violence in Lebanon. Attending the meeting were representatives from the agencies at the Regional Embassy Office (REO). The main point of discussion was the multiple mortar/rocket attacks on the REO and British compound on July 16 and 17.

¶2. (SBU) In response to reftel (A) the EAC believes that anti U.S. sentiment centers around events in Basrah rather than the situation in Lebanon. Furthermore, any demonstrations in Basrah regarding events in Lebanon would have little effect on the already deteriorated security situation in which the REO is targeted on a regular basis by indirect fire. Currently there is a tent camp of 30-50 individuals in front of the British gate of the compound who are protesting recent British arrest campaigns. Violence in Lebanon has had no impact on this protest.

¶3. (C) The REO and British compound were subjected to three separate indirect mortar/rocket attacks during the night of July 16-17. The first round of attacks occurred at 2130 on July 16 and consisted of eleven rounds, one of which landed inside the US compound and several close to the front gate. The second attack occurred at 2330 and consisted of 4 rounds, one of which landed close to one of the guard towers of the REO section of the compound and three in the Romanian sector. The third attack occurred at 0300 on July 17 and consisted of two rounds, one of which landed near the British front gate and one near an American guard tower.

¶4. (SBU) The attacks are believed to be a reaction to a coalition-led arrest campaign conducted on July 15 that resulted in the arrest of two Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) members. The Basrah APOD and Shatt Al Arab bases were also attacked on July 16-17. The attacks on the REO compound were preceded by mortar/rocket attacks on the Shatt Al Arab base at 0300 and 1500 on July 16.

¶5. (C) The EAC is closely monitoring IDF attacks directed against Basrah Palace. In recent months the EAC has noticed increased accuracy of IDF (reftel B). The EAC recognizes the limited capability of the bunkers to house the all REO personnel for an entire night. In response to the risk of further attacks, the EAC decided to close all MWR facilities at 2000 until further notice. All REO personnel must wear their personal protective equipment when traveling to the British or Romanian sides of the compound. MREs have been prepared for distribution in the event that further attacks prevent the dining facility from operating. The EAC tasked KBR to determine

how many personnel can be accommodated within the existing hard structures within the REO compound in the event prolonged attacks continue.

16. (U) The EAC will monitor events and reconvene as necessary.

MARRANO